Uashaunnuat c Québec

The Québec Court of Appeal released a decision on December 3, 2014 in <a href="http://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qcca/doc/2014/2014qcca2193/2014qcca2193.html" title="Uashaunnuat c. Quebec"><em>Uashaunnuat (Innus de Uashat et de Mani-Utenam) c. Qu&amp;#233;bec (Procureure g&amp;#233;n&amp;#233;ral)</em></a> [currently in French only], dismissing an appeal from a Superior Court decision that addressed a series of objections to the evidence, limited the issues to be addressed at the interlocutory injunction and "Haida-application" stage of the proceedings, and made various other case management arrangements.

The broader litigation in which this case arises is the legal challenge of the Innu community of Uashat mak Mani-Utenam to the authorizing certificate and orders in council underlying Hydro-Québec's La Romaine hydroelectric project that the Innu plaintiffs claim encroaches on their territory and violates their treaty rights and Aboriginal rights and title. While their broader challenge proceeds, the Innu plaintiffs have also brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to stop the construction of the project, a "Haida application" challenging the adequacy of consultation and accommodation leading up to the project's approval, and a safeguard order. 

The appellants argued that the Superior Court decision from which they appealed prevented them from clearly establishing their treaty rights and Aboriginal rights and title in the course of their application for an interlocutory injunction. The appellants had advised the trial judge of their intention to establish their case for an injunction based on not only affidavit evidence but also on the viva voce testimony of an additional 15 unidentified witnesses, which they estimated would require three weeks to hear as part of the interlocutory application. The appellants argued that this oral testimony was necessary as they intended to show that their title and rights within their traditional territories are "not only apparent, but clear". The Attorney General of Canada objected on the basis that the appellants had filed their motions for the interlocutory injunction and Haida-application some two and half years earlier, and the Attorney General had only prepared itself to respond to their earlier assertion of an "apparent right" as the basis for these applications. The Attorney General was not prepared to respond to the "clear right" the appellants now sought to establish at the interlocutory injunction stage in relation to their rights and title.

The Superior Court held that it needed to limit the evidence that would be provided by the appellants in order to prevent prejudice to the defendants. The Superior Court also identified some of the issues raised by the appellants to be heard at the interlocutory injunction stage that it viewed as having the potential to "unnecessarily prolong the debate at this stage of the proceedings". It declared that these issues were not relevant at this stage, including the question of whether infringement of the appellants' rights was justified, whether a public right to fish conflicted with the project, and various issues relating to the "balance of convenience" test and the project's environmental effects. Furthermore, the Superior Court held that evidence on economic damage should be limited to damages caused by delays to the project, and long-term economic damage will become a relevant question at the stage of determining whether a permanent injunction ought to be issued against the project. 

The Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court's decision on the basis that the lower court was tasked with ensuring that clear legislative objectives of transparency, and speedy and sound case management are met. In particular, the Superior Court was to ensure the proportionality of judicial resources dedicated to the proceedings in reference to the nature, purpose and complexity of the dispute. The Court of Appeal also noted the high degree of deference it owed to the lower court in terms of the conduct of an interlocutory application, since this is a discretional remedy of an "exceptional nature". The Court of Appeal also noted that oral evidence was only available for interlocutory injunction applications to the extent that it complements the preconstituted record; this oral evidence is not intended to provide a substitute for proof by way of affidavits.

The Court of Appeal held up the various other case management decisions of the Superior Court.